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“I Treat Everyone with Respect”: Debt Collection Attorneys as Agents of Institutionalized
Racism in a Color-blind America
How do debt collection attorneys understand their work in light of increased regulation of the
industry and its historic structural racism? Drawing on over sixty hours of observation in two
small claims courts, analysis of three months of cases, and semi-structured interviews with eight
debt collection attorneys, I argue that attorneys reinforce the instutionalized racism of debt
collection through their use of color-blind racism. Attorneys understand the state of the debt
collection industry as inevitable, denying inconsistencies in their practice that privilege white
defendants. Additionally, attorneys view themselves as helping rather than exploiting debtors, in
contrast to frequent aggressive action without regard to its consequences for defendants’ lives.
Attorneys who act with greater flexibility demonstrate the potential for lawyers to challenge the
institutional racism of debt collection. However, the historic and contemporary stigma associated
with debt collection in addition to the lack of professional prestige available to these attorneys
gives significance to color-blindness not only as an explanatory device but, also, as a stigma
management strategy. The necessity of stigma management in addition to the lack of
professional stability and autonomy for many debt collection attorneys complicates the potential
for future change.
Key words: institutionalized racism, debt collection, color-blind racism
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“I Treat Everyone with Respect”: Debt Collection Attorneys as Agents of Institutionalized
Racism in a Color-blind America
“If I pay it all off in the next twenty-one days, it won’t go on my credit score?” The
middle-aged African-American woman, Roberta1, looked concerned and paused as she spoke
with the conciliation court referee. After taking a moment to think, she continued stating “Okay,
I’ll ask my children for the money.” A payday loan company was suing Roberta for a debt of
around $560 plus $75 in court costs, a total of $635 dollars. Of the fifty debt collection cases on
the calendar for that day, Roberta was one of seven defendants who appeared in court. Although
she had worked out a payment arrangement with a representative of the company, the financial
institution still pursued, and won, a judgment against her.
Roberta’s experience has become increasingly common in the United States, particularly
for people of color. Between 1980 and 2009 American’s overall consumer debt tripled (Harvey
2010), rising from $356 billion dollars in 1980 to $876 billion dollars in 2006 (Garcia 2007).
Households were forced to rely on credit in the face of rising costs of living without subsequent
increases in earnings. This increased borrowing also followed deregulation in the credit industry,
which eliminated interest rate and fee limits for credit-granters, enabling unprecedented access to
credit (Garcia 2007).
The all-but-inevitable increase in delinquencies resulted in a substantial expansion of the
debt collection industry. Companies that specialize in collecting debt—buying debt from an
original creditor, often for pennies on the dollar, and then working to recoup the original amount
owed—saw tremendous expansion and profit growth. Encore Capital Group, for example,

1

All names have been changed to protect anonymity.
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benefited from a twofold increase in revenue between 2007 and 2013, from $366 million to $773
million (Halpern 2014).
While household indebtedness has decreased overall since the Great Recession (Brown,
Haughwout, Lee, and van der Klaauw 2013) debt burdens have not diminished equally for all
Americans. White low and middle-income families’ debt has decreased by 29% compared to just
17% for black Americans. Although Latino families have seen a 33% decrease in debt, along
with black families, their access to credit is less satisfactory (Traub and Ruetschlin 2012: 19).
Additionally, both black and Latino families experience greater numbers of denials or retractions
of credit and higher interest rates (Traub and Ruetschlin 2012: 12, 8). The difficult relationship
between the credit industry and communities of color contributes to disproportionate contact
with the debt collection industry, particularly for African-Americans, who are both called by
debt collectors and enter into settlement agreements with creditors more often than other groups
(Traub and Ruetschlin 2012: 19).
Debt collection is not an isolated process but, rather, deeply connected to economic,
social, and political structures. The racial gap in debt after the Great Recession follows longstanding inequities in wealth, the credit market, and the professions, that constitute a racist social
structure supportive of debt collection practices that contribute to ongoing inequality. Despite the
entrenched and institutionalized nature of race within the debt industry, legalized debt collection
serves as an important site of investigation given the informality of the small claims courts in
which collection cases are heard. The contingent nature of interactions between attorneys and
defendants provides potential for privileged actors, attorneys wielding advanced degrees,
occupational prestige, and whiteness, to either deconstitute or reinforce the structural racism of
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debt collection. While these lawyers work within a racist institution, their privilege and agency
give their interactions with debtors transformative potential.
Forwarding the critique of Obasogie Osagie, previous work examining racial inequality
in law, such as critical race theory, has focused on macro structures without parallel attention to
micro processes of interaction and individual experience (Osagie 2015). Work that has examined
how inequality is structured through litigation has focused on rights claims initiated by
disempowered plaintiffs (Berrey, Hoffman, and Nielsen 2012; Best, Edelman, Krieger, and
Eliason 2011). Although additional scholarly attention to how court cases in informal legal
settings—in particular conciliation courts—contribute to inequality has addressed how lowincome individuals are entangled in litigation through compulsory processes it has not engaged
with the racial implications of this entrapment (Moulton 1969). To this end, this study
contributes to ongoing empirical work regarding the institutionalized nature of race with
particular emphasis on legal actors whose behavior and understanding have the potential to
entrench or resist the structural racism of debt collection given the undeterminedness of small
claims procedures.

DEBT COLLECTION AS SHIELDED INSTITUTIONAL RACISM
In addressing the institutional racism of debt collection, I forward Bonilla-Silva’s
definition of a racist social structure as “the totality of the social relations and practices that
reinforce white privilege” (Bonilla-Silva 2010: 9) Although in this definition Bonilla-Silva
emphasizes how society structures whiteness, a racist social structure implicates economic,
political, social, and ideological practices that place all individuals in socially structured racial
categories that influence their life chances (Bonilla-Silva 1997).
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Debt collection is a racially structured institution as it lies at the intersection of historical
and social processes that have disadvantaged Americans of color while systematically benefitting
whites. It is the conjunction of these two forces that provides the substantial reinforcement of
white privilege essential to institutionalized racism.
The vulnerability of Americans of color to higher debt burdens and greater contact with
the debt collection industry (Traub and Ruetschlin 2012) arises from two separate but related
sets of forces. The first are those that impact individuals’ wealth and income, and thus their
reliance on credit. With proportionately lower income and fewer resources, a person’s greater
reliance on credit can place them at an increased risk of debt accumulation opening the potential
for future contact with the debt collection industry.
In fact, the racial wealth gap has only increased since the Great Recession. In 2013,
according to the Pew Research Center, the median net worth of white households was thirteen
times greater than of black households and ten times greater than of Latino households, an
increase from about eight and ten times greater, respectively, prior to the economic crisis
(Kochhar and Fry 2014). Wealth, which measures individuals net worth minus their debts owed,
is implicated in debt collection not only because it captures debt but, also, because of its close
relation to economic stability. Wealth protects people from economic turmoil and lack of wealth
in turbulent economic times, such as the Great Recession, can force individuals to pay for items
with credit potentially ensnaring them in cyclical debt.
Wealth inequality is rooted in historical patterns in addition to ongoing structural
inequality. The United States was built on the subjugation of black slaves, written into the
constitution as property rather than humans, and, since that time, law, policy, and individuals
have reproduced socioeconomic standards that maintain the subordination of African-Americans
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(Feagin 2000). Sociologist Joe Feagin terms this social reproduction but, in my own use, I want
to emphasize the materialist nature of this reproduced privilege. In considering wealth,
historically-rooted inequality is evident in the exclusion of African-Americans from the housing
and education benefits of the GI Bill of 1944, a law that built the middle class as we know it (Liu
et al. 2006; Newfield 2008). In addition to historical forces, ongoing structural inequality
reinforces and reproduces the wealth gap. For example, in 2015, the unemployment rate was
9.6% for blacks and 6.6% for Latinos compared to 5% for white people (Bureau of Labor
Statistics). This inequity is linked to the labor market itself as well as other related institutions,
and is, in part, sustained through ongoing discrimination (Pager, Bonikowski, and Western
2009).
The racial structure of debt collection, specifically, follows from differential access to
credit in addition to wealth inequality. Academic evidence suggests, for instance, that blacks and
Hispanics experience higher rejection rates and less favorable terms when securing mortgages,
controlling for credit history and higher interest rates on both car loans and mortgages (Pager and
Shepherd 2008; Chiteji 2010). Although the vast majority of research into discrimination in the
credit market focuses on mortgages, other studies suggest that people of color experience more
difficulty in securing access to consumer credit as well, such as Hawley and Fujii’s study (1991)
that demonstrated that, controlling for credit history, nonwhite individuals experience more
unsuccessful credit searches. Contributing to racialized access to credit are conceptions that
people of color, particularly African-Americans, are riskier borrowers (Chiteji 2010).
Institutionalized racism involves not only the systematic disadvantaging of people of
color but, also, processes that formalize and perpetuate the advantage of white Americans such
as those that have excluded people of color from the legal profession. In 2010 white attorneys
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comprised 88% percent of the professional body compared with 5% and 4% black and Hispanic
lawyers, respectively (ABA 2016). In comparison, the national population is 77.1% white and
13.3% and 17.6% black and Hispanic, respectively (US Census 2016). Although there is not
county-level data available that would allow comparison based on the more diverse local
populations in the communities studied, there is national data that shows that as wage and status
of a legal position decrease, the proportion of minority workers increases. In legal positions that
do not require a law degree Blacks and Hispanics each form about 10% of the working
population (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016).
The whiteness of the legal profession has not arisen organically. As John Sutton writes,
“the legal profession has been much more effective at excluding people of color,” than women or
white-assimilating immigrants (2001: 245). Prior to 1943 the ABA did not allow AfricanAmericans to become members and, although the proportion of people of color in the legal
profession has risen since that time, rising educational standards and the closing of part-time and
un-ABA-approved law schools have continued to limit people of color’s entry into the profession
(Sutton 2001: 246).
Given the integrity of the processes that create the structure of legal debt collection, those
that privilege whites and disadvantage people of color, legal actors reinforce rather than
transform the institutionalized racism of legal debt collection through their application of colorblind racism. Color-blind racism, as defined by Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2010), refers to the
attribution of racialized phenomenon to non-racial causes such as concluding residential
segregation follows from individual choice rather than structural forces. Bonilla-Silva identifies
four frames of colorblind racism: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and
minimization of racism. While debt collection reflects historical structural racism it is not
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popularly understood as a racialized industry. Thus, the first two aspects of colorblind racism—
abstract liberalism and naturalization—are most applicable as their use is not entirely dependent
on acknowledging and re-attributing existing racism. Rather, individuals can deploy abstract
liberalism and and naturalization to further obscure racist structures. Abstract liberalism refers to
the abstract use of ideas of both political liberalism, or equal opportunity, and economic
liberalism, or individual choice, to explain racist social structures. Using naturalization,
individuals explain racist phenomena as “just the way things are,” denying historical and
structural forces (Bonilla-Silva 2010: 28).
Debt collection attorneys rely on color-blind logic to not only explain but, also, justify
their behavior. Debt collection is an historically stigmatized profession, a classic example of
moral dirty work (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). Furthermore, at this historical moment, debt
collection attorneys are working at the apex of two processes that have augmented the potential
stigma of the profession by increasing the perceived exploitiveness of the debt collection
industry, particularly as a system of institutionalized racism. The first is heightened attention on
the financial industry generally, and debt collection specifically, following the Great Recession.
This is evidenced both in popular press and policy shifts, such as the creation of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau in 2011 and the overhaul of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
in 2010. The second is increased public awareness of ongoing racial inequality evident in, for
example, the creation and media coverage of the social movement Black Lives Matter. Thus,
both longstanding and contemporary attention to debt collection and racial inequality have
increased the stigma associated with legal debt collection.
As attorneys perform the dirty work of debt collection they become polluted by stigma,
as defined by Goffman (1968), in a process of stigma-transfer (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). In
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turn, debt collection attorneys engage in stigma management techniques in an attempt to evade
responsibility for the stigmatizing behavior and reduce its offensiveness (Meisenbach 2010;
Benoit 1995). For debt collection attorneys these stigma management techniques use the logic of
color-blind racism thereby shielding lawyers from accountability for participation in structurallyracist activities.

METHODS
This study draws on over sixty hours of observation, eight semi-structured interviews in
two case sites and analysis of three months of one county’s case records. I observed small claims
courts in two metropolitan districts, both in the largest cities in their respective states. I attended
around thirty debt collection calendars, approximately fifteen in each city, which each included
between twenty and fifty debt collection cases. Site visits lasted for approximately two hours and
involved the observation of courtroom proceedings and, when possible, negotiations between
debt collection attorneys and defendants. Through these observations I identified key attorneys
and approached them to request interviews. Many of these attorneys offered me brief remarks
but declined formal interviews. After securing one interview I engaged in snowball-sampling,
requesting connections with colleagues and acquaintances. Around 75%, or six, of my interviews
followed from these connections. Of these, four interviews were secured through engagement
with a debt collection professional organization. Although these debt collection attorneys might
differ from others due to, for instance, higher self-conscious image management as a result of
engaging in professional development, I feel comfortable drawing conclusions about debt
collection more generally from this sample because the views expressed by attorneys engaged
with the professional organization did not differ substantially from those not involved. In
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addition, given a high level of consistency between case procedures and outcomes in all cases
observed, I feel confident that the behavior of interviewees was consistent with that of other
attorneys.
In interviews I asked broad, open-ended questions about how attorneys make case
decisions and understand their work. I did not ask questions about the racial structure of debt
collection or race more generally for several reasons. Most significantly, I did not initially
structure this project as addressing race; rather, my findings suggested I prioritize this aspect
over other features of legal debt collection. Rather than a limitation, the lack of explicit emphasis
on race gave me greater access to attorneys who were, in line with professional norms, defensive
and reticent. Along with my identity as a young, white woman who shared interview subjects’
racial identity, but not their level of education and experience, the lack of explicit emphasis on
race encouraged attorneys to speak at length and in an explanatory fashion. Additionally, the
emergence of race as a theme in my observation without parallel emphasis in my questions
created a conflict between courtroom reality and attorneys’ perceptions, an incongruence that
invited explanation.
While this study was conducted in two phases in two different cities, the analysis draws
on these examples simultaneously instead of treating the two cities as comparative cases.
Although the data is not completely parallel—in one city I rely more on archival analysis while
in the other I collected more interview data—the findings show striking similarities.
Additionally, I conducted similar observations in each location, allowing triangulation of data
despite differences. Examining race as a structural phenomenon requires the prioritization of
trends in place of nuances. At the end of a six-month period of data collection I am surprised by
the similarities rather than the differences across these two cities. In understanding debt
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collection as a field in which systemic racism and constructions of whiteness operate, I am
particularly surprised because these cities differ tremendously in terms of the sizes of their
populations, their racial diversity, and their racial histories. In examining these two locations at
once I emphasize the significance of debt collection’s institutional racism and the pervasive use
of color-blind racist ideology explain attorneys’ actions and shield them from responsibility.

COLOR-BLIND RACISM AS STIGMA MANAGEMENT
After the Great Recession, the Dodd-Frank Act subjected the debt collection industry to
significantly increased oversight with the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) and the overhaul and expansion of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the FDCPA
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; Federal Trade Committee 2010). Many of the attorneys
I interviewed indicated that these legal changes have significantly changed the debt collection
industry and, indeed, my observations reflected the caution and constraint under which lawyers
now work: attorneys would often ask referees or judges if they would like to see paperwork
before they were asked to provide it, attorneys began conversations with debtors by providing
the disclaimer that they are acting as debt collectors and any communication between the
attorney and the debtor is an attempt to collect that debt, and emphasized their roles as debt
collectors when defendants sought legal advice. In interviews, attorneys expressed awareness of
this concern. Some attorneys understood new regulation as positive, such as Susan, a lawyer with
fifteen years of experience, who stated:
I think [the industry] has changed and I think it’s change for the better. I think the
new regulations are better. When there weren’t any regulations it was easier to just
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throw all the debt out there and just collect it the best you can with no documents,
no statements, just a number on a spreadsheet.
However, many attorneys addressed the potential stigma associated with increased regulation by
not only suggesting that the debt collection industry has responded positively to changes but,
also, by questioning the legitimacy of new policies entirely. Several attorneys expressed
skepticism of the legitimacy of cases brought against their firm under the strengthened FDCPA,
stating that they had never been taken to court on a claim and any complaints brought against
them by the CFPB were dismissed immediately. Furthermore, rather than understanding
increased scrutiny of their actions as deserved, attorneys presented themselves as victims of
policy change. Even attorneys, like Susan, who acknowledged that some things had changed for
the better framed their profession as the target of newly exploitative practices. Susan alluded to “
boutique firms [that] have popped up that their whole business model is to go after debt
collection attorneys for minute problems.”
In a legal environment increasingly hostile to their profession, debt collection attorneys
blame debtors for increased aggression. One attorney stated that “the FDCPA has become a
sword rather than a shield for debtors,” and another lawyer attributed all claims against them to
debtors that were angry at them for simply doing their job and attempting debt collection. Thus,
in response to a potentially stigmatizing increase in regulation and oversight debt collection
attorneys both suggest that the industry has reformed in the ensuing seven years and that any
changes were unnecessary and have unfairly persecuted lawyers. Attorneys’ responses to shifts
in the debt collection industry, in particular the emphasis they place on their victimization, stand
in sharp contrast to debt collection’s ongoing structural inequality, revealing the disconnect
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between lawyers’ self-perceptions and the reality of their participation in a racially structured
industry.

Debt Collection as Institutionalized Racism
The site of legal debt collection, the conciliation courtroom, is racialized in both
demographic and symbolic ways. I sat in on about five hundred debt collection cases throughout
my observation of court calendars. I noted that attorneys represented clients on multiple cases
per calendar and there was often continuity across days, with the same lawyers present in court
during multiple site visits. Additionally, defendants were not present for most collection cases, I
estimate that debtors appeared in court for around twenty percent of all cases. Taking these
factors into consideration, I observed around one hundred distinct debt collection attorneys and
one hundred defendants. Throughout observation, I identified one debt collection attorney who
was a person of color and around ten defendants who were white. Thus, in observation the racial
structure of debt collection was evident as about 99% of all attorneys observed appeared white
while the defendants with whom they interacted were 90% people of color.
However, the construction of the courtroom as a white space extends beyond
demographics as the historically constituted racist social structure of legal debt collection is
sustained through ongoing social processes and interactions. Examining how the courtroom is
mapped in racist physical and social terms, what Ruth Frankenberg (1993) calls racial social
geography, illuminates how it is not just the bodies present but, also, the ensuing social
interactions and their implicit meanings that racialize space, as the following anecdote indicates.
“Oh what an interesting name, how exotic, I wonder how you say it?” the small claims
referee wondered aloud, all the while squinting to focus on her computer screen which displayed
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a list of the cases for the day. At this point in the court calendar the “contested” cases (how court
referees and attorneys referred to all cases with a defendant present) were finished and the
remainder of the cases were without defendant. The referee, an older white woman, sat on the
bench surrounded by four other white woman, the court clerk, the attorney for the plaintiff, her
paralegal, and myself. The referee continued, asking out-loud, “I wonder where it is from?” I
wondered at the sincerity of this question as my personal history includes spending a year
working in a predominantly African-American school and a summer spent serving as a camp
counselor for black youth and I immediately read this names as belonging to a black woman.
Although the defendant was not there, and I could not verify my assumption, the referee’s
response to this name is significant, in particular, as this was not an isolated incident. Referees
routinely questioned black and foreign-sounding names, wondering aloud when defendants were
not present or asking defendants to pronounce their name for them, without parallel curiosity
about white-coded names. Names are an important aspect of identity as they form an essential
part of our public identity and inform our interactions with institutions such as law and
education. In exoticizing names of only some individuals, predominantly people of color, the
small claims court referee demonstrated the social whiteness of the court space.
The reading of defendants’ names provided an opportunity for white actors to not only
construct the courtroom as a white space but, also, made visible the operation of white privilege
for legal actors. The referee began to read one African-American woman’s name. However after
she, presumably, began to mispronounce it the woman repeated the name herself as she
approached the front of the courtroom. In response to this correction the referee laughed and said
“you don’t even want to know what my maiden name was, people were always confused by it.”
In drawing a parallel between this defendant’s experience and her own, the referee erased
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important structural differences in their positions. While the referee's name may have confused
individuals, it likely did not lead to discrimination, as research shows black or Latino-coded
names do for people of color (Bertrand and Mullaithan 2004).
The racial geography of spoken interaction includes not only names but also, language.
This was particularly evident in the larger of the two cities that I studied as its greater racial and
ethnic diversity beget larger numbers of non-English, and particularly, Spanish, speakers
interacting with the court system. To accommodate the large number of Spanish-speaking
individuals the court system employs several translators who appear as needed. Despite this
accommodation the demand for translators is often greater than their availability, leading to wait
times and disruptions in court speed and efficiency. Attorneys and judges would often express
frustration while waiting, asking the court clerk where the translator was and verifying that the
clerk had called for them. On one occasion an attorney, hoping to find a makeshift translator,
asked me if I spoke Spanish. In addition to verbally expressing frustration and bewilderment,
judges and attorneys would also continue to speak English to non-English speakers. In these
continued attempts at communication white legal actors would increase the volume and decrease
the speed of their speech. Although this is, perhaps, a natural reaction to a language barrier and
universal across situations, it is also symbolic in a racialized space. In continuing to speak to
non-English speakers in slower, simpler English, white legal actors signal that Spanish-speaking
people of color are simply incompetent rather than differently fluent.
It is not only peripheral courtroom encounters that privilege and normalize whiteness but,
also, one of the most potentially influential interactions in the process of legal debt collection. In
pre-hearing negotiation debt collection attorneys representing financial institutions and debt
collection companies attempt to reach a settlement agreement with debtors. These encounters are
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important, in particular, because they are a time of flexibility during which debtors have the
opportunity to negotiate their debt. In a 2014 episode of the National Public Radio show “This
American Life” author Jake Halpern and host Ira Glass identify the “magic words” of debt
collection as “show me the paper” (Glass and Halpern 2014). In my observation, the pivotal
phrase was, instead, “make me a deal.” Although I observed around twenty negotiations between
debt collection attorneys and debtors, either as a bystander in the courtroom hallway or an
invited guest in a private room, I only observed debtors successfully lowering the total amount of
debt on two occasions. Both of these defendants were white women.
Debt collection attorneys represent financial institutions and, although all the attorneys I
spoke to indicated that they were happy to “work something out” with defendants, they will not
initiate decreasing the amount of debt included in the claim of their lawsuit. Therefore, if
individuals seek to negotiate the terms of their debt they must initiate a bartering exchange. It is
not inconsequential that the two individuals I observed engaging in negotiation were both white.
Business negotiations are a racialized process and studies show that people of color have less
success in these types of interactions when, for instance, renting a car (Ayres 1991). Having the
ability to navigate these conversations reflects a form of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1993)
particularly when compared to conversations between debtors of color and debt collection
attorneys.
In these conversations defendants did not ask directly for decreases in the claim amount,
or the dollar amount sought by attorneys in the court case. Rather, debtors attempted to explain
their financial situation to attorneys as a narrative. In settlement conversations many defendants
of color explained the situations that prompted their indebtedness such as medical emergencies,
unexpected pregnancies or sudden job loss. In response, attorneys either offered no formal
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response, instead communicating regret or apologies and then continuing with their settlement
conversation for a consistent debt amount, or asked defendants to engage in the formal hardship
process of the lending institution. This echoes work by O’Barr and Conley (1985) on narrative
and litigant satisfaction versus legal inadequacy by suggesting that litigants’ desire to narrate
their experiences extends beyond the formal boundaries of the hearing and decreases their ability
to both create a legally substantive argument for the referee and engage in informal pre-hearing
negotiation.
The debt collection courtroom reflects how institutionalized racism creates not only
disparate social processes but also racist social geography, embedding white privilege in both the
physical and social qualities of the space. This racist social structure is particularly important in
debt collection because of its consistency. Analysis of three months of cases in one of the sites
revealed that in 89.5% of debt collection cases the defendant, the debtor, does not appear. In
addition, about 81.5% of cases end in judgments against the debtor. The consistency between
cases, which also reflects observational data, gives great significance to how attorneys
understand their work. If attorneys are able to identify the inequalities inherent in debt collection
both systemically and in their own work perhaps they could take advantage of existing flexibility
to resist outcomes that disproportionately impact people of color.

Everyone Has a Sob Story: Legitimacy and Normativity
Why do we collect debt? Debt collection attorneys suggest that debt collection is central
to the functioning of society. One attorney, Bill, has worked in the collections industry for forty
years. He considers himself an industry leader, “a big fish in a small pond.” When he considered,
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without prompting, the importance of his work he emphasized the historical significance of
credit:
If you go back and read Charlotte Brontë, or Little Women, or all that they all talk
about reputation. What they’re really talking about is the reputation of that person
for paying bills so this idea of credit, collection, is centuries, millennia old. You
know, our economy is credit based and if we went back to the old days of cash
millions of people would be out of work and we would be destitute as a nation.
Accordingly, due to the importance of credit to the nation, attorneys emphasized that individuals
have to pay their bills in order to keep credit available and argue that if there were not
“enforcement mechanisms” that no one would pay their debts. All of the attorneys whom I
interviewed expressed viewpoints similar to Mark’s: “It’s my opinion that if you owe money,
you have to pay that money.”
Debt collection lawyers’ allusion to the importance of credit to society and an
uncontextualized norm of paying back debt naturalizes the procedures of debt collection by
suggesting that the way things are currently is the way things have always been and the way they
must be. This naturalization denies inconsistencies within attorneys’ practices. Although there is
great similarity in case processes, attorneys do make exceptions. In addition to negotiations in
which debt obligations are reduced, interview subjects also recalled instances in which they did
not pursue judgment against a debtor. Susan told this story:
One time I had a nun come into court. In full habit in court. She had a gambling
problem, I am not doing that. There is no way, this is not happening. I am not
suing this nun. This case is now dismissed. And I guess there is that freedom, there
are so many cases that you can let one go, you know, the weak of the herd.
Another attorney, Lucy, explained that after the great recession she was more willing to work
with defendants because “you know they can’t pay because it’s the recession.” Following the
stabilization of the economy, she is less inclined to settle with defendants. As she states “now I
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see that this individual has just taken out a lot of loans.” What these two perspectives share is the
whiteness of the debtors in question. Considering that 59% of American Catholics are white, it is
likely that the nun in question was a white woman (Lipka 2015). In addition, all Americans debt
burdens were greater during the Great Recession and, thus, Lucy’s allusion to greater personal
flexibility during this time period suggests she was more willing to work with people when debt
collection was less a form of institutionalized racism and more a taken-for-granted factor of the
economy.
Instead of viewing debtors’ personal stories about their inability to pay as reasonable,
several attorneys framed these admissions as “excuses.” Matt phrased it this way: “everyone has
a sob story and, I’ll say this, I hope that they are true.” Susan went so far as to say that she did
not want to hear what people had to say. However, as attorneys’ own anecdotes suggest, this
skepticism is not universally applied. Instead, it disproportionately impacts people of color,
standing in contrast to lawyers’ willingness to compromise and work something out with white
debtors. If we understand part of debt collection attorneys’ work as stigma-management, the
disconnect between lawyers prioritization of the way things have to be and the reality that
exceptions are made reflects efforts by attorneys to distance themselves from responsibility for
their work. Attorneys’ understandings of the larger place of debt collection in society cannot
incorporate incongruent personal experiences, as this would illuminate their own responsibility
for the exploitation inherent in debt collection.

I Respect Everyone: Attorneys as White Saviors
Even if lawyers were to acknowledge that the status of modern debt collection is not
inevitable, debt collection attorneys could justify their work as part of a liberal project, drawing
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on color-blind racism’s frame of abstract liberalism. Several of the attorneys I interviewed
understood their work as helpful to individuals in debt. Bill put it this way:
I’m helping people...do you know how people feel when they can settle it and get
it off their minds and they can move on with their life, their debts hang over them
and hang over their necks like an albatross and I am in a position where I can help
with that
One debt collection firm even formalized this viewpoint in their workplace policies, placing
signs on the walls of their call centers, in which staff members attempt contact with defendants,
that read “Most Firms= Us vs. Them, Our Firm=You and I Together Against This Debt.” Debt
collection lawyers conceptualizing their work as helpful to individuals in debt, together with the
racialized nature of debt collection, invokes the “white savior” phenomenon. This concept, used
by film analysts, refers to processes in which a white person enters a space in which people of
color live and struggle through the social order. Through a process of relationship building the
white person transforms these individuals, allowing them, finally, to succeed in life (Hughey
2014; Vera and Gordon 2002). The white savior is a civilizing narrative in which individuals that
do not embody American liberalist ideals, of hard work and success, are made able to fulfill
these expectations through the intervention of a white person. The debt collection process
provides for a similar opportunity as individuals who have transgressed societal norms, such as
paying off debts or fulfilling obligations, are pulled into interactions with white attorneys which
can serve as points of transformation or maintenance depending on if the debtor and the attorney
“work together” to enter a judgment against the debtor and “resolve” the matter.
Furthermore, attorneys understand themselves as exceptionally able to assist defendants.
Susan explained that “It’s not the most glamorous profession but I comfort myself thinking that
if I was in this situation it could be me on the other side and at least I treat people with dignity
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and respect.” While I did not ask specific questions about how attorneys understood their
participation in debt collection, each person that I interviewed focused on their own behavior
framing it in similar terms of respect, professionalism, and understanding debtor’s dignity. This
reframe emphasizes how naturalizing debt collection and engaging with defendants as a white,
liberal, savior, privileges the debt collector’s experience over that of the defendants with whom
they work. Attorneys are able to obscure the racial nature of debt collection because the focus is
not on who the debtors are but on who attorneys are: white knights both helping the country as a
whole by pursuing debt and assisting the poor through their kindness and professionalism.
Attorneys reject the deceptiveness that classifies debt collection as dirty work and, instead,
accept understandings of their work as helpful, reducing the offensiveness of their role in
collection and de-stigmatizing their professional identity.
Framing debt collection in these terms denies the flexibility of attorneys’ actions and
precludes the possibility that debt collection is institutionalized racism. Furthermore, attorneys’
reliance on naturalization and abstract liberalism as explanations for their professional practices
de-emphasizes attorney’s aggressive actions against debtors which are most clear in instances
when lawyers seek judgment against debtors regardless of their material circumstances, in direct
contrast to market-based rationality.
If You Can’t Pay It Let Me Get a Judgment Against You
The attorney, who looked like what older professionals call a “baby lawyer,” fresh out of
law school, stepped in front of the judge and said, “we are entering an agreed order for a
judgment against her. She’s working as a part-time babysitter and is not making enough money
for us to collect on her so we are just going to enter the judgment today.” This courtroom scene,

Miller 24

while not uncommon, is confusing. Why do attorneys seek judgments against individuals who do
not have the money to either enter into a payment agreement or qualify for wage or bank
garnishment in post -judgment proceedings?
In response to this uncertainty attorneys regularly invoked the “lottery” explanation. In
this trope, an attorney seeks a judgment from an individual who is unable to pay the debt and
does not make enough money or own sufficient assets to permit garnishment. The attorney is
unable to collect the debt at this time but seeks a judgment, just in case. Ten, fifteen, or twenty
years pass (in both cities in which I conducted my study judgments are valid for up to twenty
years) and the defendant wins the lottery. The client, thankful that they obtained a judgment, asks
the attorney to attempt collection action against the debtor once again.
This justification highlights the illogical nature of pursuing judgments against individuals
that cannot pay. An person’s chance of winning the lottery are extremely small and, beyond that,
the reality of economic mobility is largely mythic in the United States, particularly for people of
color (Bowles, Gintis, Osborne Groves 2005). Attorneys’ rationality cannot be attributed to
market-based logic alone and calls for considering, as Lauren Edelman suggested, how this
rationality is specific to these actors, white debt collection attorneys and debtors of color, as well
as these situations (Edelman 2004). The rationality implicit in debt collection attorneys’ actions
with defendants is an extension of their valuation of liberal ideals as an embodiment of
colorblind racism.
Joseph Conti’s (2008) work, which addresses how litigation and judgments can follow
from communicative as well as market-based rationality, clarifies how attorneys’ insistence on
judgments can serve as normative domination against poor, people of color., once again, extends
the concept of the white savior, a judgment becomes not just an opportunity for a financial
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company to regain losses but, also, is transformed into an opportunity for white attorneys to both
delineate the requirements of liberalist ideals and punish their transgressors.
What is emphasized in attorneys’ narratives, as well as their actions in court, is admission
of guilt. As Matt put it “I always tell defendants: if you owe the money and you can’t pay it, just
admit you owe the money and I’ll get a judgment against you; if you owe the money, let me get a
judgment. I can’t enforce it.” In this interaction attorneys are asking for individuals to submit to
their understanding of the case. Admitting owing the money is an acknowledgement that the
creditor has both the correct interpretation of the incident, that you are the individual that owes
the money, and is taking the correct action, filing a lawsuit against you and seeking a legal
judgment. Securing judgments against an individual, even if they cannot pay it, becomes a way
for attorneys and their clients to receive legal victory and maintain normative concepts
surrounding credit, responding to the concern Bill expressed: “if we didn’t have enforcement
mechanisms who would pay their bills? If your neighbors didn’t have to pay for their house why
would you be a schlump and pay for your house?” However, these communicative goals,
centered on abstract liberalism, deny the way that these legal outcomes impact individuals’ lives.

Is This Going to Affect My Credit Score: Judgments and Ripple Effects
“Will this affect my credit score?” the defendant, a middle-aged African-American
woman, asked the referee, insistently. The concern was evident in her voice and, indeed, she had
asked other defendants this same question and wondered aloud prior to her hearing. In response,
the referee replied immediately and succinctly, without looking up from the papers in front of
him, “I don’t know, you’d have to ask the credit rating agencies.” Anxiety over how debt-related
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judgments would impact their credit score was something many defendants expressed, whether
directly to the judge, during casual conversation before the court calendar began, or to the debt
collection attorney as they tried to reach settlement. Although occasionally these questions were
met with helpful comments, such as information about how to submit a satisfaction of judgment
to credit rating agencies, more often they were answered with silence or avoidance of the
concern all together.
However, judgments have the potential to significantly influence individuals’ lives. Civil
judgments are incorporated into credit rating agencies’ rating models (Avery, Calem, and Canner
2004). Credit ratings, in turn, influence individuals’ interactions with many institutions.
Individuals are asked to provide their credit scores in banking negotiations, such as when
applying for a credit card or a loan, but also in a number of other, diverse situations such as when
applying for a job or renting an apartment. Considering that Americans of color already
experience discrimination in the job, housing, and banking markets, reduced credit scores from
debt-related judgments compound existing institutional inequality (Pager and Shepherd 2008).
That the powerful individuals in the court environment, the debt collection attorneys and the
referees or judges, are not able or willing to provide information to debtors about this system
speaks to both their privilege, in not having to see or worry about credit ratings, but also suggests
that debt negotiations are potentially sites of manipulation and abuse for debtors if they do not
have access to the information necessary to make decisions in their cases.
Here, I turn to William Sewell’s (1992) emphasis on the social and collective nature of
structure. Although debt collection reflects deeply entrenched, historical patterns of inequality,
attorneys have the opportunity to transform these structures in their professional lives. As I have
noted, debt collection attorneys’ professional practices do differ despite high levels of
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consistency in how cases are handled and these differences matter. While the inconsistencies in
practice can and do benefit white defendants exclusively attorneys’ flexibility can also benefit all
defendants, disproportionately people of color. For instance, in one of the case sites attorneys
cannot continue cases but must, instead, dismiss them or seek judgment. In a continuance, the
case moves forward to another court date without a final decision on that day. In response to this
situational constraint most attorneys seek judgments against debtors even if the two parties have
reached a payment agreement in which the defendant commits to pay the debt off in several
small payments. Thus, even when defendants are making efforts to work with attorneys they are
subject to judgments which damage their credit score.
During the course of observation, I witnessed two attorneys who did not follow this
practice. Instead, they dismissed the case without prejudice when they have reached a payment
agreement. This means that the attorney has leave to file the case again, should the payment
agreement fall through, but that, in the meantime, debtors are able to work towards paying off
the debt without the additional burden of a civil judgment decreasing their access to resources
such as housing and credit. Under Sewell’s theory of structure, this shows that some attorneys
are using a different set of schema in the same context, viewing judgments not as inevitable or
communicative but, instead, a last resort.
Are more attorneys likely to transform their business practices? Sewell emphasizes how
the social nature of structure is not just individualistic but, also, collective (Sewell 1992: 21).
Agency in structure involves not only individual decisions but, also, group coordination: a
sharing of ideas that provides the remobilization of resources and collective power. The
continued inequality perpetuated by legal debt collection stems not only from its connection to
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historical inequality but also to attorney’s denial and obscuration of debt collection’s racial
nature through the application of color-blind racism.

CONCLUSIONS
How could racial progress manifest in legal debt collection? Could all attorneys approach
cases in ways that enhanced flexibility and minimized collateral consequences for defendants,
such as attorneys that delay seeking judgment? Understanding debt collection attorneys use of
color-blind racism’s frames as, in part, a response to consciousness of a stigmatized professional
identity is only part of the puzzle. Debt collection attorneys’ professional identities are
stigmatized not only because they engage in the dirty work of collection but, also, because of
their place in the legal profession as a whole.
Law has long awarded attorneys a high level of occupational prestige. However, as more
individuals graduate law school than the industry can absorb, and as changes in the nature of
legal work have increased efficiency and, thus decreased the demand for highly skilled legal
work, law has become an increasingly stratified profession with income inequality that reflects
differences in prestige among attorneys (Abbott 1988; Leahey and Hunter 2012). Leahey and
Hunter (2012) created a model for understanding intra-professional prestige inequity that
analyzes prestige inequity along specialty area, client type, professional purity, and professional
power. Particularly interesting to consider in connection with debt collection law is the
dimension of professional purity. Professional purity refers to “pure tasks that require not simply
diagnosis and treatment but also inference” involving tasks that are closely related to the use of
abstract, legal knowledge rather than administrative duties (Abbott 1988, Leahey and Hunter
2012). Debt collection attorneys, in their participation in “routine” small claims lawsuits engage
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in professionally impure work that decreases their occupational prestige and, subsequently, their
income and authority.
The attorneys whom I observed that were were able to make flexible case decisions
differed from the average debt collection lawyer in several significant ways. They tended to have
more senior positions in law firms after longer careers providing them security and autonomy
that associates or freelancing attorneys lacked. As attorneys with less professional power often
work on commission, their revenue is directly related to the amount of money they recoup from
debtors through payment agreements and judgments which could greatly limit their flexibility in
any one case. Unlike high status legal work, interviewees repeatedly emphasized that they
entered debt collection in response to constraint and lack of alternatives in an over-flooded labor
market. Some attorneys that represent financial institutions are not even employees of the hired
firm and are compensated poorly to make court appearances.
In this way, the responsibility for the racial inequality that is reinforced through legal
debt collection lies beyond individual attorneys who are, themselves, subject to structural forces
that have constrained their choices. Financial institutions have out-sourced their dirty work and,
in the process, taken advantage of historical trends that left many attorneys scrambling to remain
in the legal profession. Calling attorneys into conversations about holding financial and legal
institutions responsible for fairly compensating work and creating court structures that provide
the time and resources to inform defendants could provide a path forward. As it stands, debt
collection attorneys must interact with poor people of color who are neither represented nor
knowledgeable of the legal system while meeting the demands of their clients. Additionally, it is
integral to call on industry leaders, like several of the lawyers I interviewed, to widen the
conversation, advocate for their peers without equivalent professional authority, and lead
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collective actions to express their agency as decision-makers in the courtroom in ways that
enhance flexibility and understanding for defendants. Honoring the agency of debt collection
attorneys signifies not only holding them accountable for the ways their behaviors and
understandings reinforce inequality but, also, examining ways in which external constraints have
conditioned their actions. It is particularly important to look for tangible ways forward as poor
people of color do not seek but are entrapped by the legal debt collection process.

Miller 31

REFERENCES
Ashforth, Blake E. and Glen E. Kreiner. 1999. ""How Can You Do It?": Dirty Work and the
Challenge of Constructing a Positive Identity." The Academy of Management Review
24(3):413-434.
ABA Lawyer Demographics Year 2016.2016. American Bar Association.
Consumer Response Annual Report.2016. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Employed persons by detailed occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino origin. 2016.
online: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Quick Facts: United States.2016. online: United States Census Bureau.
Abbott, Andrew D. 1988. The System of Professions : An Essay on the Division of Expert
Labor.Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
Anderson, Jami L. 2002. "The White Closet." Social Philosophy Today 18:97-107.
Avery, Robert B., Paul S. Calem and Glenn B. Canner. 2004. "Consumer Credit Scoring: Do
Situational Circumstances Matter?" Journal of Banking & Finance 28(4):835-856.
Ayres, Ian. 1991. "Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations."
Harvard Law Review 104(4):817-872.
Benoit, William L. 1995. Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration
Strategies.Albany: State University of New York Press.
Berrey, Ellen, Steve G. Hoffman and Laura B. Nielsen. 2012. "Situated Justice: A Contextual
Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation." Law &
Society Review 46(1):1-36.

Miller 32

Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhi Mullainathan. 2004. "Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination." American
Economic Review 94(4):991-1013.
Best, Rachel K., Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger and Scott R. Eliason. 2011. "Multiple
Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation." Law &
Society Review 45(4):991-1025.
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 1997. "Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation."
American Sociological Review 62(3):465-480.
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2010. Racism without Racists : Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence
of Racial Inequality in the United States.Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bourdieu, Pierre, Craig J. Calhoun, Edward LiPuma and Moishe Postone. 1993. Bourdieu :
Critical Perspectives.Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
Bowles, Samuel, Herbert Gintis and Melissa Osborne Groves. 2005. Unequal Chances : Family
Background and Economic Success. Princeton, N.J. : Russell Sage Foundation, Princeton
University Press.
Brown, Meta, Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee and Wilbert van der Klaauw. 2013. "The
Financial Crisis at the Kitchen Table: Trends in Household Debt and Credit." Current Issues
in Economics and Finance 19(2):1-10.
Chiteji, N. S. 2010. "The Racial Wealth Gap and the Borrower's Dilemma." Journal of Black
Studies 41(2):351-366.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. "The Bureau.", Retrieved November 16, 2026.
(http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/).

Miller 33

Conti, Joseph A. 2008. "The Good Case: Decisions to Litigate at the World Trade Organization."
Law & Society Review 42(1):145-182.
Edelman, Lauren B. 2004. "Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society Approach
to Economic Rationality." Law & Society Review 38(2):181-198.
Federal Trade Commission. 2010. "Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.":801.
Feagin, Joe R. 2000. Racist America : Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations.New
York : Routledge.
Frankenberg, Ruth. 1993. White Women, Race Matters : The Social Construction of
Whiteness.Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press.
Garcia, Jose. 2007. "Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Rapid Growth of Credit Card Debt in
America."
Glass, Ira and Jake Halpern. 2014. "532: Magic Words." This American Life, August 15, 2014.
Goffman, Erving. 1968. Stigma : Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York, New
York : Simon & Schuster Inc.
Halpern, Jake. 2014. "Paper Boys: Inside the Dark, Lucrative World of Consumer Debt
Collection." The New York Times.
Harvey, David. 2010. The Enigma of Capital : And the Crises of Capitalism. Oxford, England:
Oxford University Press.
Hawley, Clifford B. and Edwin T. Fujii. 1991. "Discrimination in Consumer Credit Markets."
Eastern Economic Journal 17(1):21-30.
Hughey, Matthew W. 2012. "Racializing Redemption, Reproducing Racism: The Odyssey of
Magical Negroes and White Saviors." Sociology Compass 6(9):751-767.

Miller 34

Kochhar, Rakesh and Richard Fry. 2014. "Wealth inequality has widened along racial, ethnic
lines since end of Great Recession." Pew Research Center, Retrieved December 8, 2016.
(http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/).
Leahey, Erin and Laura A. Hunter. 2012. "Lawyers' Lines of Work: Specialization's Role in the
Income Determination Process." Social Forces 90(4):1101-1131.
Lui, Meizhu and United for a Fair Economy. 2006. The Color of Wealth : The Story Behind the
U.S. Racial Wealth Divide. New York : New Press.
Lipka, Michael. 2015. "Key Finding about American Catholics." Pew Research Center.
Facttank: News in the Numbers. Retrieved December 14, 2016
(http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/02/key-findings-about-american-catholics).
Meisenbach, Rebecca J. 2010. "Stigma Management Communication: A Theory and Agenda for
Applied Research on how Individuals Manage Moments of Stigmatized Identity." Journal of
Applied Communication Research 38(3):268-292.
Moulton, Beatrice A. 1969. "The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as
Performed by the Small Claims Court in California." Stanford Law Review 21(6):1657-1684.
Newfield, Christopher. 2008. Unmaking the Public University : The Forty-Year Assault on the
Middle Class. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.
O'Barr, William M. and Conley, John M. 1985. "Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in
Small Claims Court Narratives." Law & Society Review 19(4):661-702.
Pager, Devah and Hana Shepherd. 2008. "The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets." Annual Review of
Sociology 34(1):181-209.

Miller 35

Pager, Devah, Bart Bonikowski and Bruce Western. 2009. "Discrimination in a Low-Wage
Labor Market : A Field Experiment." American Sociological Review 74(5):777-799.
Sewell, William H. 1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation."
American Journal of Sociology 98(1):1-29.
Sutton, John. 2001. Law/society : Origins, Interactions, and Change. Thousand Oaks, Calif.:
Pine Forge Press.
Traub, Amy and Catherine Ruetschlin. 2012. The Plastic Safety Net: Findings from the 2012
National Survey on Credit Card Debt of Low- and Middle-Income Households. Demos.org:
Demos.
Vera, Hernan and Andrew Gordon. 2002. Screen Saviors: Hollywood Fictions of Whiteness.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

